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THE BAR ON SCIENCE
Eileen Gay Jones*
Reviewing: SHEILA JASANOFF t SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA (Harvard University
Press, 1995)

The final cause of law is the welfare of society.!
Law and social science have benefited from an enduring relationship. Roundtables on "The Role of Social Science in the
Courtroom" or such similar topics frequent bar association meetings. Panels on "Law and Society" or "The Impact of Judges' Socioeconomic Background on Decision Making: X, Y, Z Regression Model Findings" make a regular appearance at social science
conferences. This is the age of blurred academic boundaries in
which not only the social sciences but other disciplines as well inform and shape our understandings of law and the legal process.
As an interdisciplinarian myself, I have courted the somewhat
foreign yet akin fields of political science, public health, and law.
An appreciation of the culture of science is crucial to those who
litigate toxic torts, for example, or those who participate in the
formation of environmental law and policy. Scholars searching for
understanding of how law and the legal system shape science have
added terms such as "junk science" and "trans-science" 3 to our
lexicon. This may explain the lore of Sheila Jasanoff's work.
Jasanoff is a prolific scholar in the area of research that may
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern University Law Center; J.D., Temple
University; Ph.D. candidate, Tulane University. I wish to thank Anthony Caldwell,
J.D., Southern University Law Center 1997, for his assistance with this project.
t Professor and Chair, Department of Science and Technology Studies, Cornell
University.
1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921).
2. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM

(1991).
3. Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209 (1972).
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broadly be described as environmental policy-making.
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This no-

nascent research7
menclature characterizes both a process and
6
group consisting of engineers psychologists, political scientists,
economists,8 and among others, attorneys and legal scholars. 9
Since environmental consciousness and regulation entered the

mainstream political agenda of American life,' academics have

studied the unique attributes of policy-making relevant to the
natural environment and health of its denizens. In the process sci4. See, e.g., RONALD BRICKMAN ET AL., CONTROLLING CHEMICALS: THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1985); SHEILA
JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS (1990);
SHEILA JASANOFF, RISK MANAGEMENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE (1986); Sheila
Jasanoff, Acceptable Evidence in a Pluralistic Society, in ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE:
SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 29 (Deborah G. Mayo & Rachelle D.

Hollander eds., 1991); Sheila Jasanoff, American Exceptionalism and the Political
Acknowledgment of Risk, 119 DAEDELUS 61 (Fall 1990); Sheila S. Jasanoff, Contested
Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science, 17 SOC. STUD. SCI. 195 (1987); Sheila
Jasanoff, CulturalAspects of Risk Assessment in Britainand the United States, in THE
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF RISK 359 (Branden B. Johnson & Vincent
T. Covello eds., 1987); Sheila Jasanoff, EPA's Regulation of Daminozide: Unscrambling the Messages of Risk, 12 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES, Summer-Fall 1987, at
116; Sheila Jasanoff, Introduction: Learning from Disaster, in LEARNING FROM
DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 1994); Sheila
Jasanoff, Judicial Gatekeeping in the Management of Hazardous Technologies, 25 J.
MGMT. STUD., Oct. 1986, at 353; Sheila Jasanoff, Managing India's Environment, 28
ENV'T 12 (1986); Sheila Jasanoff, Negotiation or Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Middle
Road for U.S. Policy?, 2 ENVTL. F., July 1983, at 37; Sheila Jasanoff, Norms for
Evaluating Regulatory Science, 9 RISK ANALYSIS 271 (1989); Sheila Jasanoff, Peer
Review in the Regulatory Process, 10 SCI., TECH., & HUM. VALUES, Summer 1985, at
20; Sheila Jasanoff & Dorothy Nelkin, Science Technology, and the Limits of Judicial
Competence, 214 ScI. 1211 (1981); Sheila Jasanoff, The Bhopal Disasterand the Right
to Know, 27 SoC. ScI. & MED. 1113 (1988); Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should
Know About the Sociology of Science, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 345 (1992).
5. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Risk Perceptionand Communication Unplugged:
Twenty Years of Process, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 137 (1995) (the author is a faculty member of Carnegie Mellon University's Department of Engineering and Public Policy).
6. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RISK
ANALYSIS 675 (1993); Paul Slovic, Perceptionof Risk, 236 SCI. 280 (1987) (the author
is a professor of psychology at the University of Oregon).
7. See, e.g., DANIEL MAZMANIAN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE:
AMERICA'S TOXICS POLICY FOR THE 1990S (1992) (Daniel Mazmanian is a political

science professor at the Claremont Graduate School).
8. For example, William H. Desvousges, an economist, coauthored Nevada's
Predicament,30 ENV'T 17 (1988), with Howard Kunreuther and Paul Slovic.
9. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Multi-CulturalismRedux: Science, Law, and Politics, 11 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 1 (1993).

10. In the 1970s Americans became interested in environmental issues. See
Robert Cameron Mitchell, Public Opinion and the Green Lobby: Poised for the
1990s?, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 81, 81-

99 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1990).
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ence and technology have fulfilled important functions, defined
natural phenomenon, identified causes of degradation to ecological and human health, and proposed intervention and cleanup
strategies. Many have come to believe that in the environmental
context, science and technology are not value-neutral but necessarily involve making judgments about allocation of limited resources and even stressing some cultural concerns to the exclusion
of others." How science advances knowledge, therefore, warrants
attention. Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in
America (Science at the Bar)12 focuses on the role American courts
play in the development of what becomes accepted as scientific,
technical, and medical knowledge.
Science at the Bar is an excellent contribution to the environmental policy dialogue as legislatures revisit the scope of environmental regulation and in the process, demarcate the role of science
in meeting contemporary conceptions of the public good." Tort
reform, festered by perceptions of unconscionably high verdicts 4
and escalating malpractice insurance rates, further support critical
inquiry into the relationship between law and science. Different
ideas about what constitutes evidence and causation contribute to
the frustration generated by the perceived unfairness in tort litigation. At the same time, public confidence in scientific and technical expertise continues to wane, as does faith in public officials'
credibility." Underlying the dissatisfaction with the status quo is
the struggle over who will participate and make decisions about
what is acceptable science, in particular, whether or to what extent
the public will have a voice in the creation of scientific knowledge.
11. See, e.g., Robert R. Kuehn, The Environmental Justice Implications of
Quantitative Risk Assessment, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 103; Robert B. Reich, Public

Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 YALE L.J. 1617
(1985).
12. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY

IN AMERICA (1995) [hereinafter SCIENCE AT THE BAR].
13. See, e.g., Comprehensive Wetlands Conservation and Management Act of
1995, S. 352, 104th Cong., (1995). This Bill is a proposed amendment to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (1996).
14. See Catherine Yang, Commentary: Tort Reform Needs Reforming, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 15, 1996, at 67.
15. See Mike Austin, Tort Reform Hasn'tDeliveredPromised Economic Benefits,
Consumer Group Says, CIi. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 26, 1996, at 1.
16. See Daniel J. Fiorino, Environmental Risk and Democratic Process: A Critical Review, 14 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 501 (1989); Peter M. Sandman et al., Agency
Communication, Community Outrage, and Perception of Risk: Three Simulation Experiments, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 585 (1993).
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In turn, this strongly influences the future directions of scientific
research, a subject of particular import in an age of scientific
change, uncertainty, and budgetary constraints. In this light, the
need to understand the role that courts may play in scientific development is paramount. Jasanoff is to be commended for cutting
through to some of the more fundamental issues: Are judges a
positive force in the dynamic of searching for what passes as factual conclusions or scientific evidence? How do the courts and the
law interact with scientific and technical experts?
Jasanoff systematically supports her main premise: the culture of law and science are each unique and both cause tensions
among the respective camps while at the same time mutually
complimenting each other's shaping of scientific research and
knowledge. Her methodology is select case law analysis. Unfortunately, little justification is provided for isolating a few dozen
cases for study; one should not conclude that they are representative of the thousands of cases litigated each year. It is, then, a
qualitative study and should be read with this understanding. In
the future quantitative studies would add to the rigor of Jasanoff's
work as would a more detailed discussion of the rationale for
choosing select cases, considering such factors as the year they
were filed, litigated, and decided; the level of court that entertained the decision highlighted; whether the court was a state or
federal court and from what region of the country; and the judicial
philosophy of the judge who determined the matter. Considering
the type of law that is at issue should also prove insightful. Statutory law, it has traditionally been argued, leaves less room for judicial maneuvering than does common law." In short, the validity
of Jasanoff's findings on a broad scale should be tested using other
methodologies.
It would also be informative to test Jasanoff's theory using
other legal doctrines in addition to the limited number presented.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,for example, allows fact finders to
infer facts. The culture of science is more parsimonious with the
use of inference; repeated observations generalizable on a large
scale are the accepted methodological norm.18 In the context of res
ipsa loquitur, one might question whether this might have had or
17. See CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 113, 119-20.
18. See SCIENCE AT THE BAR, supra note 12, at 214. Law does not have to see;
moreover, one specific occurrence is not only sufficient but is all that is essentially
important in any given trial.
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will have an impact on waste management or other decisions that
will impact the environment: What inferences are courts willing to
make about injury, environmental hazards, and culpability? Other
legal doctrines may have the same impact. The legal system is unlikely to undergo a radical transformation in the next twenty years.
Thus, the role of many legal principles must be accounted for in attempting to describe and explain the dynamic between law and
science. Jasanoff has, however, provided the ground work for such
future studies and invites further research to explore the relationship between "legal process, scientific authority, and political culture."' 19
Science at the Bar highlights the topics of products liability,
toxic torts, evidence, reproductive and biomedical rights, and
euthanasia. Jasanoff successfully uses the development of products liability law-particularly the evidentiary standards used in
products liability cases-to illustrate the influence judicial decisions and the law have had on contemporary standards of scientific
fact-finding and the creation of knowledge. The law has not required absolute certainty of an event in order to assess liability.
Thus, manufacturers whose product, in part or per se, was a cause
of injury have been deemed liable. If science had determined causation in these cases, a precise cause or the cause would have been
tested and found to a high degree of probability as demonstrated
by repeated performances. Had that been the case, it is unlikely
that product safety would have developed as rapidly, if at all, and
with as high standards. The same judicial philosophy that governed products liability passes to the generation of judges who
consider toxic torts and hazardous exposure cases. By not establishing a standard of absolute certainty, courts have been able to
push the envelope of scientific and technological responses to
modern environmental hazards. If, therefore, one sees a less risky
environment as beneficial, the law has been a positive force in
guiding scientific and technological inquiry.
Jasanoff does not address the issue of the cost of these developments. Perhaps a future piece would consider the trade-offs involved in a litigious society yearning to maintain economic prosperity. Science at the Bar does, however, shed light on the issue of
how Americans confront and abate or control health risks posed
by the environment and the alterations made to it by modern soci19. Id-at 225.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:801

ety. If only the science that is well-accepted in the scientific community is privileged or accepted as valid, then incentives to develop new theories and practical applications of those theories is
controlled and limited by peer groups of scientists. Law steps in to
ensure the inclusiveness of public health and safety demands into
the incentive matrix. Jasanoff provides invigorating insight into
the ongoing debate over incentives to engage in environmentally
conscious behavior. While placing herself in the camp that believes that business and industry must not be left unbridled to
make decisions that affect the environment, she adds a depth of
understanding that has been shadowed by regulatory research. Indeed, courts are proactive players in establishing incentives for
business and industry to scrutinize their policies more carefully
with an eye toward public health and safety.
Jasanoff's discourse also includes a tour into applied democratic theory. To her mind, courts have played a positive role in
democratizing science by forcing scientific experts to explain their
findings in terms understandable to laypersons.2 ° The court is yet
another political institution that provides an avenue to public participation 2 ' Thus, Jasanoff opposes the creation of courts whose
function is exclusively scientific decision making. These courts
would not be "public friendly" but would be another institution of
expertise beyond the purview of public involvement. Underlying
the belief in public participation is the assumption that science,
like any discipline, is fraught with value judgments.2 In the absence of litigation, Jasanoff asserts, scientists may not question
their theories and assumptions, leading to invalid, erroneous, or
socially undesirable conclusions. In order to expose these assumptions, lay input is needed. Moreover, if value judgments are
inherent in scientific research and such research is for the public
good, it is the members of society or their representatives who
should hold the decision-making power. Why courtrooms fulfill
this function better than laboratories is complex; Jasanoff moves
the dialogue forward on this issue.
Part of the tort and environmental reform movement today
20. See id. at 214.
21. See id. at 215.
22. See Nicholas A. Ashford & Karin A. Gregory, EthicalProblems in Using Science in the Regulatory Process, 2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T J. 13 (1986); Elaine
Vaughan, The Significance of Socioeconomic and Ethnic Diversity for the Risk Communication Process,15 RISK ANALYSIS 169 (1995).
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questions the political territory courts have carved out for themselves. Much of tort reform is designed to regain turf taken over
by courts. Jasanoff does a fine job of demonstrating the value of
court review of scientific decisions. Courts watchdog in the public
interest and referee internecine disputes among competing scientific claims. One might question, however, the normative considerations. Is the judiciary the political institution where social
judgment, such as policy formation, should be rendered? Perhaps
both proponents of tort reform and Jasanoff are avoiding the
question of legislatures' abdication of their policy role. Creating
policy involves the airing of grievances on a large scale, deliberation, negotiation, leadership, and responsiveness to the public.
Query: Can scientists or courts fulfill these needs of American
democracy?
Jasanoff also delves into the issue of judicial decision making
in the age of scientific uncertainty, 3 highlighted by the much discussed and often maligned Dow breast implant litigation. 24 Here
she considers the role of burden of proof. In the laboratory attention is focused on empirical data of a sufficient size and validity. It
must pass probability and hypothesis testing. In contrast, courtroom analysis does not focus on the general, but the specific,
namely the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A variety of evidence is introduced, but particular emphasis is placed on treating physicians.
Although Jasanoff does not highlight personal, subjective testimony, that too plays an important role in litigation, yet it is marginalized by science as anecdotal, atypical, or not relevant. Courts
are
inclined in each case to favor a holistic (or medical) to a
reductionist, toxicological model of illness. The holistic
view focuses on the suffering individual and asks whether,
given the totality of circumstances, this person could have
been affected in the stated way by the stated exposure....
This view is sharply at odds with the opinion of some
toxic tort critics that general causation must be established priorto specific causation.25
Jasanoff cites Allen v. United States? to illustrate the dynamic
of burden of proof, causation, and scientific uncertainty. In that
23. See SCIENCE AT THE BAR, supra note 12, at 114-37.
24. See id. at 50.

25. Id at 125.
26. 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984).
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case plaintiffs claimed that they had developed cancer from federal facility nuclear fallout, a by-product of nuclear testing. Although the testing was found to be covered by the doctrine of sovereign immunity on appeal, the trial court's rulings regarding
causation were not reversed. The trial judge ordered that once
plaintiffs had met the burden of proving that
they had been exposed to radiation during the period of
atomic testing and that the available epidemiological evidence linked their particular form of cancer with radiation, the judge concluded that radiation had been a
"substantial factor" in increasing the plaintiff's [sic] risk
of cancer. The claimant was awarded damages unless the
government could prove that the particular instance of
cancer was not caused by fallout.z
Again, Jasanoff exposes gaps of uncertainty filled with reasonable
inferences by the law. In turn, science conforms to political and
societal expectations about the state of the environment and the
risk it poses to human health.
Environmental policy-making requires bedfellows of a host of
characters who tussle and turn and who, in the end, find comfortable positions. In the process each learns from the other, and from
this exchange, sometimes feud and fight. Hopefully, decisions that
are optimal for society are found. Science at the Bar reminds us
that neither the legal system nor science and technology can be
shielded from the outside world but must learn to listen to its signals and respond to its needs.

27. SCIENCE AT THE BAR, supra note 12, at 126 (citations omitted).

